Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 16, Issue 4, pp 557–567 | Cite as

Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods

  • Lars-Gunnar Svensson


Strategy-proof allocation of a finite number of indivisible goods among a finite number of individuals is considered. The main result is that in a pure distributional case, a mechanism is strategy-proof, nonbossy and neutral if and only if it is serially dictatorial. If the indivisible goods are initially owned by the individuals, a mechanism is strategy-proof, individually rational and Pareto consistent if and only if it is the core mechanism.


Finite Number Distributional Case Core Mechanism Indivisible Good 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1999

Authors and Affiliations

  • Lars-Gunnar Svensson
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Economics, Lund University, P.O. Box 7082, SE-22007 of Lund, Sweden (e-mail:

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