Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 15, Issue 2, pp 297–311

Strategy-proof division with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments

  • Bettina Klaus
  • Hans Peters
  • Ton Storcken
Article

Abstract.

We consider the problem of (re)allocating the total endowment of an infinitely divisible commodity among agents with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments. We propose an extension of the so-called uniform rule and show that it is the unique rule satisfying Pareto optimality, strategy-proofness, reversibility, and an equal-treatment condition. The resulting rule turns out to be peaks-only and individually rational: the allocation assigned by the rule depends only on the peaks of the preferences, and no agent is worse off than at his individual endowment.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • Bettina Klaus
    • 1
  • Hans Peters
    • 1
  • Ton Storcken
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Quantitative Economics, University of Maastricht, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The NetherlandsNL

Personalised recommendations