Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 15, Issue 2, pp 237–238 | Cite as

A strong paradox of multiple elections

  • Marco Scarsini


We consider a stronger version of the paradox of multiple elections and show that it is possible that not only the winning combination of propositions, but also all the combinations sufficiently close to it, receive zero votes.


Strong Version Winning Combination Multiple Election Strong Paradox Zero Vote 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • Marco Scarsini
    • 1
  1. 1.Dipartimento di Scienze, Università D'Annunzio, Viale Pindaro 42, I-65127 Pescara, Italy (e-mail:

Personalised recommendations