Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 18, Issue 1, pp 135–153 | Cite as

Core in a simple coalition formation game

  • Suryapratim Banerjee
  • Hideo Konishi
  • Tayfun Sönmez


We analyze the core of a class of coalition formation game in which every player's payoff depends only on the members of her coalition. We first consider anonymous games and additively separable games. Neither of these strong properties guarantee the existence of a core allocation, even if additional strong properties are imposed. We then introduce two top-coalition properties each of which guarantee the existence. We show that these properties are independent of the Scarf-balancedness condition. Finally we give several economic applications.


Coalition Formation Formation Game Economic Application Strong Property Core Allocation 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Suryapratim Banerjee
    • 1
  • Hideo Konishi
    • 2
  • Tayfun Sönmez
    • 3
  1. 1.Department of Economics, McGill University, Montreal, Canada H3A 2T7CA
  2. 2.Department of Economics, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA 02467, USAUS
  3. 3.University of Michigan and Department of Economics, Koç University Istinye, 80860, Istanbul, TurkeyTR

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