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Upper set rules with binary ranges

  • Makoto HagiwaraEmail author
  • Hirofumi Yamamura
Original Paper
  • 47 Downloads

Abstract

We investigate the social choice problem in which the range of a rule consists of only two alternatives. While Barberà et al. (Int J Game Theory 41:791–808, 2012a) capture the feature of “strategy-proof” rules based on the monotonicity condition of winning coalitions, we newly consider the “monotonicity condition with respect to the direction of preference changes.” We show that a rule is strategy-proof if and only if it satisfies the monotonicity condition of preference changes. In addition, we define the class of “upper set rules,” and show that these rules are characterized by strategy-proofness.

Notes

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Industrial Engineering and Economics, School of EngineeringTokyo Institute of TechnologyTokyoJapan
  2. 2.Faculty of Business AdministrationKomazawa UniversityTokyoJapan

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