Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel

  • Salvador BarberàEmail author
  • Dolors Berga
  • Bernardo Moreno
Original Paper


We stress the importance that Arrow attached to studying the role of domain conditions in determining the validity of his impossibility theorem, a subject to which he devoted two chapters of Social Choice and Individual Values. Then we partially survey recent results about the role of domain conditions on the possibility to design satisfactory aggregation rules and social choice functions, as a proof of the continued vitality of this subject, that he pioneered, as he did with so many others.



We are thankful to the Journal Editor, Mark Fleurbaey, and to two extremely helpful referees, for comments and suggestions. We are also grateful to the editors of this special issue for allowing us to participate in this homage to Kenneth Arrow. S. Barberà acknowledges financial support through Grants ECO2014-53052-P and SGR2014-515, and Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563). D. Berga and B. Moreno acknowledge the financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science, Industry and Competitiveness through Grants ECO2016-76255-P and ECO2017-86245-P, respectively, and thank the MOMA network.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Salvador Barberà
    • 1
    Email author
  • Dolors Berga
    • 2
  • Bernardo Moreno
    • 3
  1. 1.Departament d’Economia i d’Història EconòmicaMOVE, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, and Barcelona GSEBellaterraSpain
  2. 2.Departament d’EconomiaUniversitat de GironaGironaSpain
  3. 3.Departamento de Teoría e Historia EconómicaUniversidad de MálagaMálagaSpain

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