Civic capital and support for the welfare state

  • Roy Cerqueti
  • Fabio SabatiniEmail author
  • Marco Ventura
Original Paper


We model how the interplay between tax surveillance institutions and civic capital shapes taxpayers’ support for the welfare state. We show that, when tax surveillance is tight, rational civic-minded individuals express greater support for welfare spending than uncivic ones. We provide empirical evidence of these preferences using data from Italy, a country that has long posed a puzzle for public economists for its limited civic capital and large welfare state.



We are indebted to two anonymous reviewers whose comments led to a substantial improvement of the paper. We are grateful to Joshua D. Angrist, Maurizio Franzini, Marcella Nicolini and Marc Sangnier for helpful comments and suggestions. Usual disclaimers apply.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Economics and LawUniversity of MacerataMacerataItaly
  2. 2.Department of Economics and LawSapienza University of RomeRomeItaly
  3. 3.IZABonnGermany

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