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Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 52, Issue 1, pp 1–28 | Cite as

Welfare egalitarianism with other-regarding preferences

  • Rafael TreibichEmail author
Original Paper

Abstract

We consider the problem of dividing a perfectly divisible good among individuals who have other-regarding preferences. Assuming no legitimate claims and purely ordinal preferences, how should society measure social welfare so as to satisfy basic principles of efficiency and fairness? In a simple model of average externalities, we characterize the class of social preferences which give full priority to the individual with the lowest egalitarian equivalent.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of Southern DenmarkOdenseDenmark

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