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Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 51, Issue 4, pp 595–619 | Cite as

The impact of redistribution mechanisms in the vote with the wallet game: experimental results

  • Leonardo Becchetti
  • Vittorio Pelligra
  • Francesco Salustri
Original Paper

Abstract

We use the vote-with-the-wallet game to model socially or environmentally responsible consumption, an increasingly relevant but still under-researched phenomenon. Based on a theoretical model outlining game equilibria and the parametric interval of the related multiplayer prisoners’ dilemma we evaluate with a controlled lab experiment players’ behaviour in the game and test the effects of an ex post redistribution mechanism between defectors and cooperators. Our findings document that the redistribution mechanism interrupts cooperation decay and stabilizes the share of cooperators at a level significantly higher, even though inferior to the Nash equilibrium.

Notes

Acknowledgements

The study was funded by SmartLab (http://www.smartlabkaralis.com). We thank Andrea Attar, Marco Battaglini, Francesco Bogliacino, Mark Brockway, Giacomo Corneo, Maurizio Fiaschetti, Werner Güth, Luca Lambertini, Victor Murinde, Christine Oughton, Arsen Palestini, and François Salanie for their helpful suggestions and all the participants to the 2015 seminar held at the University of Berlin, the 2015 Luiss lab seminar in Rome, the 2016 Villa Mondragone Economic Conference, the 2016 RES-PhD Meeting in London, the 2017 DeFiMS seminar at SOAS University of London, and the 2017 IEA World Congress in Mexico City for the useful comments and suggestions received. We are also grateful to Alejandra Vasquez, Tiziana Medda, and Antonio Fadda for their invaluable research assistance provided throughout this project.

Supplementary material

355_2018_1130_MOESM1_ESM.pdf (448 kb)
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355_2018_1130_MOESM2_ESM.pdf (215 kb)
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Leonardo Becchetti
    • 1
  • Vittorio Pelligra
    • 2
  • Francesco Salustri
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Economics and FinanceUniversity of Rome Tor VergataRomeItaly
  2. 2.Department of Economics and BusinessUniversity of CagliariCagliariItaly

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