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Strategy-proof location of public bads in an interval

  • Abhinaba LahiriEmail author
  • Ton Storcken
Original Paper
  • 67 Downloads

Abstract

We consider collective decision rules placing finitely many public bads in a region, modeled by a line segment. Agents’ preferences are lexicographic extensions (lexmin) of Euclidean single dipped preferences on this interval. The class of all rules satisfying strategy-proofness and Pareto optimality is characterized. These rules pick only boundary locations by monotone voting.

Notes

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Economic SciencesIndian Institute of Science EducationBhopalIndia
  2. 2.Department of Quantitative EconomicsMaastricht UniversityMaastrichtThe Netherlands

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