Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 48, Issue 3, pp 659–678

Social preferences, accountability, and wage bargaining

  • Martin G. Kocher
  • Odile Poulsen
  • Daniel J. Zizzo
Original Paper

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-017-1028-x

Cite this article as:
Kocher, M.G., Poulsen, O. & Zizzo, D.J. Soc Choice Welf (2017) 48: 659. doi:10.1007/s00355-017-1028-x
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Abstract

We experimentally test preferences for employment in a collective wage bargaining situation with heterogeneous workers. We vary the size of the union and introduce a treatment mechanism transforming the voting game into an individual allocation task. Our results show that highly productive workers do not take employment of low productive workers into account when making wage proposals, regardless of whether only union members determine the wage or all workers. The level of pro-social preferences is small in the voting game, but it increases if the game becomes an individual allocation task. We interpret this as an accountability effect.

Supplementary material

355_2017_1028_MOESM1_ESM.pdf (128 kb)
Supplementary material 1 (pdf 127 KB)

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Martin G. Kocher
    • 1
    • 2
    • 3
  • Odile Poulsen
    • 4
  • Daniel J. Zizzo
    • 5
  1. 1.University of MunichMunichGermany
  2. 2.Institute of Advanced StudiesViennaAustria
  3. 3.University of GothenburgGothenburgSweden
  4. 4.CBESS and School of EconomicsUniversity of East AngliaNorwichUK
  5. 5.Business SchoolNewcastle UniversityNewcastle upon TyneUK

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