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Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 47, Issue 2, pp 387–411 | Cite as

Corruption and bicameral reforms

  • Giovanni Facchini
  • Cecilia Testa
Original Paper
  • 276 Downloads

Abstract

During the last decade unicameral proposals have been put forward in fourteen US states. In this paper we analyze the effects of the proposed constitutional reforms, in a setting where decision making is subject to ‘hard time constraints’, and lawmakers face the opposing interests of a lobby and the electorate. We show that bicameralism might lead to a decline in the lawmakers’ bargaining power vis-a-vis the lobby, thus compromising their accountability to voters. Hence, bicameralism is not a panacea against the abuse of power by elected legislators and the proposed unicameral reforms could be effective in reducing corruption among elected representatives.

Keywords

Bargaining Power Vote Strategy Legislative Body Closed Rule Electoral Accountability 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of Nottingham, Universita’ degli Studi di Milano, CEPR, CES-Ifo, CReAM, GEP, IZA and LdANottinghamUK
  2. 2.University of Nottingham LdA and NICEPNottinghamUK

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