Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 47, Issue 2, pp 349–358 | Cite as

Commitment and anticipated utilitarianism

Original Paper


Much empirical evidence demonstrates that individual preferences may not be consistent. This leads to an important question: how should societal preferences be formulated when individuals behave inconsistently? This paper, restricted to a class of preferences, addresses this question by (1) proposing a new method to rationalize individual preferences; (2) introducing a new version of Pareto principle with respect to the rationalized preferences; and (3) characterizing the societal preferences which respect this principle.



I would like to thank David Ahn, Antoine Billot, Itzhak Gilboa, Ani Guerdjikova and Marcus Pivato. I am especially grateful to the associate editor and two anonymous referees for detailed comments which led to substantial improvements in the paper.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.LemmaUniversity of Paris 2ParisFrance

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