Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 45, Issue 3, pp 479–488 | Cite as

Introduction to the special issue “Experiments on conflicts and conflict resolution”



This special issue brings together a series of eight articles dealing with experiments on conflict and conflict resolution. The papers presented here originate from a workshop on experiments on conflict held in Rennes, France, in May 2012. The aim of the special issue is threefold: (i) investigating the main determinants of conflicts, (ii) measuring the consequences of conflicts in terms of social welfare losses, and (iii) presenting and discussing different mechanisms and institutions as well as their limitations to reduce and/or prevent conflicts. All papers included here—whether they address interpersonal, intra group or inter groups conflicts—share the same methodology, namely experimental economics.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsCREM, CNRS, University of Rennes 1RennesFrance
  2. 2.CIRANOMontrealCanada
  3. 3.Department of Economics and ManagementKarlsruhe Institute of TechnologyKarlsruheGermany

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