Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 46, Issue 1, pp 1–38 | Cite as

Multiple votes, multiple candidacies and polarization

  • Arnaud Dellis
  • Mandar Oak
Original Paper


We use the citizen-candidate model to study the differential incentives that alternative voting rules provide for candidate entry, and their effect on policy polarization. In particular, we show that allowing voters to cast multiple votes leads to equilibria which support multiple candidate clusters. These equilibria are more polarized than those obtained under the Plurality Rule. This result differs from the one obtained in the existing literature, where the set of candidates is exogenous. Thus, our paper contributes to the scholarly literature as well as public debate on the merits of using different voting rules by highlighting the importance of endogenous candidacy.

JEL Classification

C72 D72 H11 

Supplementary material

355_2015_900_MOESM1_ESM.pdf (53 kb)
Supplementary material 1 (pdf 53 KB)


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Université Laval and CIRPEEQuébecCanada
  2. 2.School of EconomicsUniversity of AdelaideAdelaideAustralia

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