Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 45, Issue 3, pp 601–623 | Cite as

The trade-off between welfare and equality in a public good experiment

  • Agathe Rouaix
  • Charles Figuières
  • Marc Willinger


We report the results of an experiment on voluntary contributions to a public good in which we implement a redistribution of the group endowment among group members in a lump sum manner. We study the impact of redistribution on group contribution, on individuals’ contributions according to their endowment and on welfare. Our experimental results show that welfare increases when equality is broken, as predicted by theory (Itaya et al. in, Econ Lett 57:289–296, 1997), because the larger contribution of the rich subjects overcompensates the lower contribution of the poor subjects. However, our data suggest that the adjustment of individual contributions after redistribution is not always compatible with the predictions. In particular, subjects who become poor contribute much less than subjects who were poor since the beginning.


Public Good Social Dilemma Public Good Game Income Redistribution Public Good Experiment 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.



We acknowledge financial support from the research project “Conflict and Inequality”, Agence Nationale de la Recherche (grant ANR-08-JCJC-0115-01). Marc Willinger acknowledges financial support by Institut Universitaire de France.

Conflict of interest



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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Agathe Rouaix
    • 1
  • Charles Figuières
    • 2
  • Marc Willinger
    • 3
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsBusiness School, University of AberdeenScotlandUK
  2. 2.INRA, LAMETA, UFR d’EconomieMontpellier Cedex 2France
  3. 3.Université de Montpellier, LAMETA, UFR d’EconomieMontpellier Cedex 2France

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