Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 45, Issue 4, pp 849–866 | Cite as

Impossibility theorems are modified and unified

  • Uuganbaatar Ninjbat


Arrow’s impossibility theorem and the Muller–Satterthwaite theorem are further interconnected by showing that translating one result into the other’s setting leads to similar results. This approach generated more impossibility theorems which are interesting on their own. Moreover, an implication of having these impossibility results on a unifying impossibility theorem in Eliaz (Soc Choice Welf 22:317–330, 2004) is also discussed.



I am thankful to Susumu Cato and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. The ARDI program coordinated by the World Intellectual Property Organization provided access to most of the recent publications and without this opportunity writing this paper would have been more difficult.


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© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of MathematicsNational University of MongoliaUlaanbaatarMongolia

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