Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 45, Issue 4, pp 819–827 | Cite as

Efficient extensions of the Myerson value

  • Sylvain Béal
  • André Casajus
  • Frank Huettner


We study values for transferable utility games enriched by a communication graph (CO-games) where the graph does not necessarily affect the productivity but can influence the way the players distribute the worth generated by the grand coalition. Thus, we can envisage values that are efficient instead of values that are component efficient. For CO-games with connected graphs, efficiency and component efficiency coincide. In particular, the Myerson value (Myerson in Math Oper Res 2:22–229, 1977) is efficient for such games. Moreover, fairness is characteristic of the Myerson value. We identify the value that is efficient for all CO-games, coincides with the Myerson value for CO-games with connected graphs, and satisfies fairness.

Mathematics Subject Classification


JEL Classification

C71  D60 



We are grateful to René van den Brink for valuable comments on this article. Financial support for Frank Huettner from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) Grant HU 2205/1-1 is gratefully acknowledged. Moreover, financial support from research programs “DynaMITE: Dynamic Matching and Interactions: Theory and Experiments”, contract ANR-13-BSHS1-0010, and MODMAD is gratefully acknowledged.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Sylvain Béal
    • 1
  • André Casajus
    • 2
    • 3
  • Frank Huettner
    • 2
    • 3
  1. 1.Université de Franche-Comté, CRESEBesançonFrance
  2. 2.Economics and Information SystemsHHL Leipzig Graduate School of ManagementLeipzigGermany
  3. 3.LSI Leipziger Spieltheoretisches InstitutLeipzigGermany

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