Voting games of resolute social choice correspondences
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A resolute social choice correspondence is a social choice rule which maps preference profiles into sets of mutually compatible outcomes. We consider a fairly large class of resolute social choice correspondences and characterize the strong Nash equilibrium outcomes of their voting games in terms of a generalization of the Condorcet principle. Our findings generalize those of Sertel and Sanver (Soc Choice Welf 22:331–347, 2004) who address the same question in a more restricted framework.
We would like to thank Hervé Moulin and the anonymous referee for their valuable comments. Of course, the usual ceveat applies.
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