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Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 45, Issue 1, pp 187–201 | Cite as

Voting games of resolute social choice correspondences

  • Sinan ErtemelEmail author
  • Levent Kutlu
  • M. Remzi Sanver
Article

Abstract

A resolute social choice correspondence is a social choice rule which maps preference profiles into sets of mutually compatible outcomes. We consider a fairly large class of resolute social choice correspondences and characterize the strong Nash equilibrium outcomes of their voting games in terms of a generalization of the Condorcet principle. Our findings generalize those of Sertel and Sanver (Soc Choice Welf 22:331–347, 2004) who address the same question in a more restricted framework.

Notes

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Hervé Moulin and the anonymous referee for their valuable comments. Of course, the usual ceveat applies.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsIstanbul Technical UniversityIstanbulTurkey
  2. 2.School of EconomicsGeorgia Institute of TechnologyAtlantaUSA
  3. 3.Department of EconomicsIstanbul Bilgi UniversityIstanbulTurkey

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