Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 45, Issue 1, pp 187–201 | Cite as

Voting games of resolute social choice correspondences

  • Sinan ErtemelEmail author
  • Levent Kutlu
  • M. Remzi Sanver


A resolute social choice correspondence is a social choice rule which maps preference profiles into sets of mutually compatible outcomes. We consider a fairly large class of resolute social choice correspondences and characterize the strong Nash equilibrium outcomes of their voting games in terms of a generalization of the Condorcet principle. Our findings generalize those of Sertel and Sanver (Soc Choice Welf 22:331–347, 2004) who address the same question in a more restricted framework.



We would like to thank Hervé Moulin and the anonymous referee for their valuable comments. Of course, the usual ceveat applies.


  1. Barberà S, Coelho D (2008) How to choose a non-controversial list with k names. Soc Choice Welf 31(1):79–96Google Scholar
  2. Barberà S, Coelho D (2010) On the rule of k names. Games Econ Behav 70(1):44–61CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Erdamar B, Sanver MR (2009) Choosers as extension axioms. Theory Decis 67(4):375–384CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Farquharson R (1969) Theory of voting. Yale University Press, New HavenGoogle Scholar
  5. Gibbard A (1973) Manipulation of voting schemes. Econometrica 41:587–601CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Hurwicz L, Sertel MR (1999) Designing mechanisms, in particular for electoral systems: the majoritarian compromise. In: Sertel MR (ed) Economic behaviour and design, Vol. 4 (Contemporary Economic Issues). MacMillan, LondonGoogle Scholar
  7. Ichiishi T (1986) Stable extensive game forms with perfect information. Int J Game Theory 15:163–174CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Kaymak B, Sanver MR (2003) Sets of alternatives as Condorcet winners. Soc Choice Welf 20:477–494CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Keiding H, Peleg B (2002) Representation of effectivity functions in coalition proof nash equilibrium: a complete characterization. Soc Choice Welf 19(2):241–263Google Scholar
  10. Kelly J (1977) Strategy-proofness and social choice functions without single-valuedness. Econometrica 45:439–446CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Moulin H (1979) Dominance-solvable voting schemes. Econometrica 47:1337–1351CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Moulin H (1981) The proportional veto principle. Rev Econ Stud 48:407–416CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Moulin H, Peleg B (1982) Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory. J Math Econ 10:115–145Google Scholar
  14. Moulin H (1983) The strategy of social choice. North-Holland, NetherlandsGoogle Scholar
  15. Nakamura K (1979) The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences. Int J Game Theory 8:55–62CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Otani Y, Sicilian J (1982) Equilibrium of Walras preference games. J Econ Theory 27:47–68CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Ozyurt S, Sanver MR (2008) Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences. Soc Choice Welf 30:89–101CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Peleg B (1984) Game theoretic analysis of voting in committees, econometric society monographs in pure theory. Cambridge University Press, CambridgeCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Reffgen A (2011) Generalizing the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: partial preferences, the degree of manipulation, and multi-valuedness. Soc Choice Welf 37(1):39–59Google Scholar
  20. Roth AE, Sotomayor MAO (1990) Two-sided matching: a study in game theoretic modeling and analysis. Cambridge University Press, CambridgeCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. Sanver MR (2002) An allocation rule with wealth-regressive tax rates. J Public Econ Theory 4(1):63–69CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. Sanver MR (2005) Equilibrium outcomes of taxation endowment-pretension games in public good economies. Rev Econ Des 9(4):307–316Google Scholar
  23. Satterthwaite M (1975) Strategy-proofness and Arrow’s conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions. J Econ Theory 10:187–217CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  24. Sertel MR, Sanver MR (1999) Equilibrium outcomes of Lindahl endowment pretension games. Eur J Polit Econ 15:149–162CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  25. Sertel MR, Sanver MR (2004) Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games are the generalized Condorcet winners. Soc Choice Welf 22(2):331–347CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  26. Tadenuma T, Thomson W (1995) Games of fair division. Games Econ Behav 9(2):191–204CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  27. Thomson W (1984) The manipulability of resource allocation mechanisms. Rev Econ Stud 51:447–460CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsIstanbul Technical UniversityIstanbulTurkey
  2. 2.School of EconomicsGeorgia Institute of TechnologyAtlantaUSA
  3. 3.Department of EconomicsIstanbul Bilgi UniversityIstanbulTurkey

Personalised recommendations