Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 45, Issue 3, pp 537–559 | Cite as

Punishment, reward, and cooperation in a framed field experiment

Article

Abstract

We report the results of a framed field experiment, in which we study the effectiveness of punishment and reward in sustaining cooperation in a social dilemma. Punishments tend to be directed at non-cooperators and rewards are assigned by those who are relatively cooperative. In contrast to the results typically found in laboratory experiments, however, we find that punishments and rewards fail to increase the average level of cooperation.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Charles N. Noussair
    • 1
  • Daan van Soest
    • 2
  • Jan Stoop
    • 3
  1. 1.Department of Economics and CentERTilburg UniversityTilburgThe Netherlands
  2. 2.Department of Economics and Tilburg Sustainability CenterTilburg UniversityTilburgThe Netherlands
  3. 3.Department of Applied EconomicsErasmus University RotterdamRotterdamThe Netherlands

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