Maskin-monotonic scoring rules
We characterize which scoring rules are Maskin-monotonic for each social choice problem as a function of the number of agents and the number of alternatives. We show that a scoring rule is Maskin-monotonic if and only if it satisfies a certain unanimity condition. Since scoring rules are neutral, Maskin-monotonicity turns out to be equivalent to Nash-implementability within the class of scoring rules. We propose a class of mechanisms such that each Nash-implementable scoring rule can be implemented via a mechanism in that class. Moreover, we investigate the class of generalized scoring rules and show that with a restriction on score vectors, our results for the standard case are still valid.
KeywordsLinear Order Preference Ranking Score Vector Preference Profile Plurality Rule
We would like to thank William Thomson and an anonymous referee for their careful reading of the paper and many helpful comments.
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