Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 44, Issue 1, pp 179–208 | Cite as

An Interview with Kotaro Suzumura

  • Walter BossertEmail author
  • Marc Fleurbaey

The interview was conducted on October 4, 2007, during a Workshop associated with the 2007 Condorcet lectures delivered by Kotaro Suzumura on October 4 and 5, 2007 at the University of Caen. It was revised and expanded substantially on the occasion of Bossert’s visit to Waseda University, where Suzumura taught social choice theory and public philosophy over six years after his retirement from Hitotsubashi University until the end of March 2014.

Walter Bossert (WB) and Marc Fleurbaey (MF): We would like to know what influences attracted you to economics in general, and social choice theory and welfare economics in particular early on. We understand that, as an undergraduate student, you did not have much exposure to microeconomic theory as we think of it now, much less to social choice theory and welfare economics. How and when did you develop an interest in these topics?

Kotaro Suzumura (KS): My education in economics began at Hitotsubashi University in 1962, which is one of the best...


Social Choice Welfare Economic Choice Function Competition Policy Social Choice Theory 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of MontrealMontrealCanada
  2. 2.Princeton UniversityPrincetonUSA

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