Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 43, Issue 3, pp 577–589 | Cite as

Priority, solidarity and egalitarianism

Article

Abstract

We provide alternative axiomatic characterizations of the extended egalitarian rules (Moreno-Ternero and Roemer, Econometrica 74:1419–1427, 2006) in a fixed-population setting of the canonical resource allocation model based on individual capabilities (output functions). Our main axioms are disability monotonicity (no reduction in the amount of resources allocated to an agent after she becomes more disabled) and agreement (when there is a change in agents’ capabilities or total resources, all agents who remain unchanged should be influenced in the same direction: all unchanged agents get more or all get less or all get the same amount as before).

Notes

Acknowledgments

We are grateful to the editor in charge and the two anonymous referees for their very helpful suggestions and useful comments. All remaining errors are ours. This work was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea Grant funded by the Korean Government (NRF-2013S1A3A2055391). B.-G. Ju gratefully acknowledges the financial support from the Institute of Economic Research of Seoul National University (JUEUN Economic Research Fund).

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Economics, Seoul National UniversitySeoul Korea
  2. 2.Department of Economics, Washington University in St. LouisMOUSA

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