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Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 43, Issue 1, pp 1–10 | Cite as

Dis&approval voting: a characterization

  • José Carlos R. Alcantud
  • Annick Laruelle
Original Paper

Abstract

The voting rule considered in this paper belongs to a large class of voting systems, called “range voting” or “utilitarian voting”, where each voter rates each candidate with the help of a given evaluation scale and the winner is the candidate with the highest total score. In approval voting the evaluation scale only consists of two levels: 1 (approval) and 0 (non approval). However non approval may mean disapproval or just indifference or even absence of sufficient knowledge for evaluating the candidate. In this paper we propose a characterization of a rule (that we refer to as dis&approval voting) that allows for a third level in the evaluation scale. The three levels have the following interpretation: 1 means approval, 0 means indifference, abstention or ‘do not know’, and \(-1\) means disapproval.

Keywords

Vote Rule Approval Vote Social Choice Rule Village Election Negative Vote 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Universidad de Salamanca, Campus Miguel de UnamunoSalamancaSpain
  2. 2.Bridge, Fundamentos del Análisis Económico IUniversity of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU)BilbaoSpain
  3. 3.IKERBASQUE, Basque Foundation for ScienceBilbaoSpain

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