Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 43, Issue 1, pp 11–27

Generalized Condorcet winners

  • Aaron Meyers
  • Michael E. Orrison
  • Jennifer Townsend
  • Sarah Wolff
  • Angela Wu
Original Paper
  • 214 Downloads

Abstract

In an election, a Condorcet winner is a candidate who would win every two-candidate subelection against any of the other candidates. In this paper, we extend the idea of a Condorcet winner to subelections consisting of three or more candidates. We then examine some of the relationships between the resulting generalized Condorect winners.

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Aaron Meyers
    • 1
  • Michael E. Orrison
    • 2
  • Jennifer Townsend
    • 3
  • Sarah Wolff
    • 4
  • Angela Wu
    • 5
  1. 1.PittsburghUSA
  2. 2.Department of MathematicsHarvey Mudd CollegeClaremontUSA
  3. 3.Department of MathematicsBellevue CollegeBellevueUSA
  4. 4.Department of MathematicsDartmouth CollegeHanoverUSA
  5. 5.Department of MathematicsUniversity of ChicagoChicagoUSA

Personalised recommendations