Generalized Condorcet winners
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In an election, a Condorcet winner is a candidate who would win every two-candidate subelection against any of the other candidates. In this paper, we extend the idea of a Condorcet winner to subelections consisting of three or more candidates. We then examine some of the relationships between the resulting generalized Condorect winners.
Special thanks to Melissa Banister, Martin Malandro, and Francis Su for helpful conversations, comments, and questions. Special thanks also to the editors and anonymous referee for valuable remarks and suggestions. Meyers, Wolff, and Wu were supported through the Claremont Colleges REU by the NSF Grant DMS 0755540.
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