Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 43, Issue 1, pp 11–27 | Cite as

Generalized Condorcet winners

  • Aaron Meyers
  • Michael E. Orrison
  • Jennifer Townsend
  • Sarah Wolff
  • Angela Wu
Original Paper


In an election, a Condorcet winner is a candidate who would win every two-candidate subelection against any of the other candidates. In this paper, we extend the idea of a Condorcet winner to subelections consisting of three or more candidates. We then examine some of the relationships between the resulting generalized Condorect winners.


Equivalence Class Weighting Vector Condorcet Winner Vote Procedure Element Subset 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.



Special thanks to Melissa Banister, Martin Malandro, and Francis Su for helpful conversations, comments, and questions. Special thanks also to the editors and anonymous referee for valuable remarks and suggestions. Meyers, Wolff, and Wu were supported through the Claremont Colleges REU by the NSF Grant DMS 0755540.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Aaron Meyers
    • 1
  • Michael E. Orrison
    • 2
  • Jennifer Townsend
    • 3
  • Sarah Wolff
    • 4
  • Angela Wu
    • 5
  1. 1.PittsburghUSA
  2. 2.Department of MathematicsHarvey Mudd CollegeClaremontUSA
  3. 3.Department of MathematicsBellevue CollegeBellevueUSA
  4. 4.Department of MathematicsDartmouth CollegeHanoverUSA
  5. 5.Department of MathematicsUniversity of ChicagoChicagoUSA

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