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Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 42, Issue 4, pp 793–811 | Cite as

On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets

  • Paula Jaramillo
  • Çaǧatay Kayı
  • Flip Klijn
Article

Abstract

We consider two-sided many-to-many matching markets in which each worker may work for multiple firms and each firm may hire multiple workers. We study individual and group manipulations in centralized markets that employ (pairwise) stable mechanisms and that require participants to submit rank order lists of agents on the other side of the market. We are interested in simple preference manipulations that have been reported and studied in empirical and theoretical work: truncation strategies, which are the lists obtained by removing a tail of least preferred partners from a preference list, and the more general dropping strategies, which are the lists obtained by only removing partners from a preference list (i.e., no reshuffling). We study when truncation/dropping strategies are exhaustive for a group of agents on the same side of the market, i.e., when each match resulting from preference manipulations can be replicated or improved upon by some truncation/dropping strategies. We prove that for each stable mechanism, dropping strategies are exhaustive for each group of agents on the same side of the market (Theorem 1), i.e., independently of the quotas. Then, we show that for each stable mechanism, truncation strategies are exhaustive for each agent with quota 1 (Theorem 2). Finally, we show that this result cannot be extended neither to individual manipulations when the agent’s quota is larger than 1 (even when all other agents’ quotas equal 1—Example 1), nor to group manipulations (even when all quotas equal 1—Example 2).

Keywords

Stable Mechanism Potential Partner Stable Matchings Preference List Truncation Strategy 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Lars Ehlers, Jordi Massó, William Thomson, Hanzhe Zhang, an associate editor, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments on an earlier draft of the paper. We thank the seminar participants at Universidad de los Andes, Universidad del Rosario, GAMES 2012, and First Caribbean Game Theory Conference for valuable discussions. Ç. Kayı gratefully acknowledges the hospitality of Institute for Economic Analysis (CSIC) and financial support from Colciencias/CSIC (Convocatoria No: 506/2010), El Patrimonio Autónomo Fondo Nacional de Financiamiento para la Ciencia, la Tecnología y la Innovación, Francisco José de Caldas. The first draft of this paper was written while F. Klijn was visiting Universidad del Rosario. He gratefully acknowledges the hospitality of Universidad del Rosario and financial support from CSIC/Colciencias through grant 2010C00013 and the Spanish Ministry of Economy and competitiveness through Plan Nacional I+D+i (ECO2011–29847) and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2011-0075).

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Facultad de EconomíaUniversidad de los AndesBloque WColombia
  2. 2.Facultad de EconomíaUniversidad del RosarioBogotáColombia
  3. 3.Institute for Economic Analysis (CSIC) and Barcelona GSEBarcelonaSpain

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