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Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 41, Issue 4, pp 835–862 | Cite as

Consistency and population sensitivity properties in marriage and roommate markets

  • Burak Can
  • Bettina KlausEmail author
Original Paper

Abstract

We consider one-to-one matching markets in which agents can either be matched as pairs or remain single. In these so-called roommate markets agents are consumers and resources at the same time. Klaus (Games Econ Behav 72:172–186, 2011) introduced two new “population sensitivity” properties that capture the effect newcomers have on incumbent agents: competition sensitivity and resource sensitivity. On various roommate market domains (marriage markets, no-odd-rings roommate markets, solvable roommate markets), we characterize the core using either of the population sensitivity properties in addition to weak unanimity and consistency. On the domain of all roommate markets, we obtain two associated impossibility results.

Keywords

Pareto Optimality Marriage Market Stable Matchings Good Agent Complete Match 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsMaastricht UniversityMaastrichtThe Netherlands
  2. 2.Faculty of Business and EconomicsUniversity of LausanneLausanneSwitzerland

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