Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 41, Issue 1, pp 169–202 | Cite as

Quasi-decisiveness, quasi-ultrafilter, and social quasi-orderings

Original Paper
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Abstract

The aim of the present paper is to provide an axiomatic analysis of incomplete social judgments. In particular, we clarify the underlying power structure of Arrovian collective choice rules when social preferences are allowed to be incomplete. We propose the concept of quasi-decisiveness and investigate the properties of the collection of quasi-decisive sets associated with an Arrovian collective choice rule. In the course of this, we offer a series of applications.

Keywords

Social Choice Social Preference Econ Theory Complete Lattice Irrelevant Alternative 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Graduate School of Social SciencesTokyo Metropolitan UniversityHachioji-shiJapan

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