Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 38, Issue 4, pp 585–600 | Cite as

Decisions with endogenous frames

Original Paper

Abstract

We develop a model of decision-making with endogenous frames and contrast the normative implications of our model to those of choice theoretic models in which observed choices are determined by exogenous frames or ancillary conditions. We argue that, frames, though they may be taken as given by the decision-maker at the point when choices are made, matter for both welfare and policy purposes.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.CentERTilburg UniversityTilburgThe Netherlands
  2. 2.Department of Economics and CAGEUniversity of WarwickWarwickUK

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