Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 39, Issue 4, pp 891–905 | Cite as

Rationalizations of Condorcet-consistent rules via distances of hamming type

  • Edith Elkind
  • Piotr Faliszewski
  • Arkadii Slinko
Original Paper


In voting, the main idea of the distance rationalizability framework is to view the voters’ preferences as an imperfect approximation to some kind of consensus. This approach, which is deeply rooted in the social choice literature, allows one to define (“rationalize”) voting rules via a consensus class of elections and a distance: a candidate is said to be an election winner if she is ranked first in one of the nearest (with respect to the given distance) consensus elections. It is known that many classic voting rules can be distance-rationalized. In this article, we provide new results on distance rationalizability of several Condorcet-consistent voting rules. In particular, we distance-rationalize the Young rule and Maximin using distances similar to the Hamming distance. It has been claimed that the Young rule can be rationalized by the Condorcet consensus class and the Hamming distance; we show that this claim is incorrect and, in fact, this consensus class and distance yield a new rule, which has not been studied before. We prove that, similarly to the Young rule, this new rule has a computationally hard winner determination problem.


Vertex Cover Preference Order Vote Rule Condorcet Winner Winner Determination 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Edith Elkind
    • 1
  • Piotr Faliszewski
    • 2
  • Arkadii Slinko
    • 3
  1. 1.Division of Mathematical SciencesSchool of Physical and Mathematical Sciences, Nanyang Technological UniversitySingaporeSingapore
  2. 2.Department of Computer ScienceAGH University of Science and TechnologyKrakówPoland
  3. 3.Department of MathematicsUniversity of AucklandAucklandNew Zealand

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