Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 39, Issue 1, pp 171–205 | Cite as

Two field experiments on Approval Voting in Germany

  • Carlos Alós-FerrerEmail author
  • Ðura-Georg Granić
Original Paper


We report on two field experiments on Approval Voting conducted during actual state and federal elections in Germany. Voters provided approval ballots both for named district candidates and for state parties. The data reveal significant discrepancies in the outcomes under the official method and Approval Voting. Further, our analysis suggests that currently used voting methods do a poor job of representing the electorate’s preferences. As a consequence, some recurring features of the political landscape in a given country might be, in part, an artifice of the employed voting method.


Approval Vote Vote Method Federal Election Plurality Vote Cumulative Vote 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of KonstanzConstanceGermany

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