Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 39, Issue 1, pp 23–33 | Cite as

Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests

Original Paper


We study comparative statics of manipulations by women in the men-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism in the two-sided one-to-one marriage market. We prove that if a group of women weakly successfully manipulates or employs truncation strategies, then all other women weakly benefit and all men are weakly harmed. We show that these results do not appropriately generalize to the many-to-one college admissions model.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Sloan School of ManagementMassachusetts Institute of TechnologyCambridgeUSA
  2. 2.Institute for Economic Analysis (CSIC)BellaterraSpain

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