Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 37, Issue 1, pp 39–59 | Cite as

Generalizing the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem: partial preferences, the degree of manipulation, and multi-valuedness

  • Alexander Reffgen
Original Paper


The Gibbard–Satterthwaite (GS) theorem is generalized in three ways: First, it is proved that the theorem is still valid when individual preferences belong to a convenient class of partial preferences; second, it is shown that every non-dictatorial surjective social choice function (SCF) is not only manipulable, but it can be manipulated in such a way that some individual obtains either his best or second best alternative; third, we prove a variant of the theorem where the outcomes of the SCF are subsets of the set of alternatives of an a priori fixed size. In addition, all results are proved not only for finite, but also for countably infinite sets of alternatives.


Econ Theory Pareto Optimality Social Choice Function Strategic Vote Preference Domain 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsLund UniversityLundSweden

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