Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 36, Issue 2, pp 305–322 | Cite as

A characterization of the single-peaked domain

  • Miguel A. Ballester
  • Guillaume HaeringerEmail author
Original Paper


We provide in this paper two properties that are both necessary and sufficient to characterize the domain of single-peaked preference profiles. This characterization allows for a definition of single-peaked preference profiles without using an ad hoc underlying order of the alternatives and also sheds light on the structure of single-peaked profiles. Considering the larger domain of value-restricted preference profiles (Sen, Econometrica 34:491–499, 1966) we also provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a preference profile to be single-caved or group-separable. Our results show that for single-peaked, single-caved and group-separable profiles it is sufficient to restrict to profiles containing of either three individuals and three alternatives or two individuals and four alternatives.


Preference Relation Linear Order Prefer Alternative Social Choice Function Condorcet Winner 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Departament d’Economia i d’Història Econòmica and Barcelona Graduate School of EconomicsUniversitat Autònoma de BarcelonaBellaterra (Barcelona)Spain

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