Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 36, Issue 2, pp 267–303 | Cite as

A new monotonic, clone-independent, reversal symmetric, and condorcet-consistent single-winner election method

  • Markus SchulzeEmail author
Original Paper


In recent years, the Pirate Party of Sweden, the Wikimedia Foundation, the Debian project, the “Software in the Public Interest” project, the Gentoo project, and many other private organizations adopted a new single-winner election method for internal elections and referendums. In this article, we will introduce this method, demonstrate that it satisfies, e.g., resolvability, Condorcet, Pareto, reversal symmetry, monotonicity, and independence of clones and present an O(C^3) algorithm to calculate the winner, where C is the number of alternatives.


Weak Link Directed Cycle Election Method Strict Partial Order Strong Path 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.BerlinGermany

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