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Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 36, Issue 1, pp 121–178 | Cite as

A model of deliberation based on Rawls’s political liberalism

  • Mostapha Benhenda
Original Paper

Abstract

In this article, we present a model of deliberation based on Rawls’s political liberalism. Our formalization gives a new perspective on his political theory. Moreover, we obtain quantitative results on political deliberation under Rawlsian rules. Finally, we elaborate two arguments in favor of Rawlsian deliberation: first, deliberation is epistemically valuable when, all other things being equal, it tends to favor the better view, because in this case, deliberators settle on the better view with high probability. Second, results suggest that when citizens deliberate within the limits of Rawlsian public reason, they can reach unanimity faster than when they deliberate outside these limits.

Keywords

Good View Public Reason Political Liberalism Reasonable Disagreement Civic Education 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Ecole Normale SuperieureParisFrance

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