Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 35, Issue 3, pp 435–472

Strategic, sincere, and heuristic voting under four election rules: an experimental study

  • Karine Van der Straeten
  • Jean-François Laslier
  • Nicolas Sauger
  • André Blais
Original Paper

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-010-0448-7

Cite this article as:
Van der Straeten, K., Laslier, JF., Sauger, N. et al. Soc Choice Welf (2010) 35: 435. doi:10.1007/s00355-010-0448-7


We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked preferences, we find that the rational choice theory provides very good predictions of actual individual behavior in one-round and approval voting elections but fares poorly in explaining vote choice under two-round elections. We conclude that voters behave strategically as far as strategic computations are not too demanding, in which case they rely on simple heuristics (under two-round voting) or they just vote sincerely (under single transferable vote).

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Karine Van der Straeten
    • 1
    • 2
  • Jean-François Laslier
    • 3
  • Nicolas Sauger
    • 4
  • André Blais
    • 5
  1. 1.Toulouse School of EconomicsToulouseFrance
  2. 2.Paris School of EconomicsParisFrance
  3. 3.Ecole PolytechniquePalaiseauFrance
  4. 4.Sciences PoParisFrance
  5. 5.Université de MontréalMontréalCanada

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