Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 35, Issue 2, pp 291–317 | Cite as

Voces populi and the art of listening

Original Paper
First Online:
Received:
Accepted:

Abstract

The strategy most damaging to many preferential election methods is to give insincerely low rank to the main opponent of one’s favourite candidate. Theorem 1 determines the 3-candidate Condorcet method that minimizes the number of noncyclic profiles allowing the strategic use of a given cyclic profile. Theorems 2, 3 and 4 establish conditions for an anonymous and neutral 3-candidate single-seat election to be monotonic and still avoid this strategy completely. Plurality elections combine these properties; among the others ‘conditional IRV’ gives the strongest challenge to the plurality winner. Conditional IRV is extended to any number of candidates. Theorem 5 is an impossibility of Gibbard–Satterthwaite type, describing three specific strategies that cannot all be avoided in meaningful anonymous and neutral election methods.

Keywords

Condorcet Winner Strategic Vote Approval Vote Election Method Borda Count 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in to check access.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Alvarez RM, Boehmke FJ, Nagler J (2006) Strategic voting in British elections. Elect Stud 25: 1–19CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Arrow KJ (1963) Social choice and individual values, Cowles Foundation Monograph 12. Yale University Press, New HavenGoogle Scholar
  3. Baldwin JM (1926) The technique of the Nanson preferential majority system of election. Proc R Soc Vic n.s.39: 42–52Google Scholar
  4. Brams SJ, Fishburn PC (2003) Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting. In: Annual meeting of the American political associationGoogle Scholar
  5. Burden BC (2003) Minor parties in the 2000 presidential election. In: Weisberg HF, Wilcox C (eds) Models of voting in presidential elections: the 2000 U.S. election. Stanford University Press, StanfordGoogle Scholar
  6. Caillaud B, Tirole J (2002) Parties as political intermediaries. Q J Econ 117: 1453–1489CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Cox GW (1997) Making votes count. Strategic coordination in the world’s electoral systems. Cambridge University Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
  9. Dowding K, van Hees M (2007) In praise of manipulation. Br J Polit Sci 38: 1–17Google Scholar
  10. Dummett MAE (1998) The Borda count and agenda manipulation. Social Choice Welf 15: 289–296CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Emerson P (2007) Designing an all-inclusive democracy. Springer, New YorkCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Gehrlein WV (2006) Condorcet’s paradox. Springer, New YorkGoogle Scholar
  13. Gibbard A (1973) Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result. Econometrica 41: 587–601CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Hartvigsen D (2006) Vote trading in public elections. Math Soc Sci 52: 31–48CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Hägele G, Pukelsheim F (2001) Llull’s writings on electoral systems. Stud Llulliana 41: 3–38Google Scholar
  16. Hill ID (2001) Difficulties with equality of preference. Voting Matters issue 13: 8–9Google Scholar
  17. McLean I (1990) The Borda and Condorcet principles: three medieval applications. Soc Choice Welf 7: 99–108CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Myatt DP (2007) On the theory of strategic voting. Rev Econ Stud 74: 255–281CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Nanson EJ (1882) Methods of election. Trans Proc R Soc Vic 18: 197–240Google Scholar
  20. Ng Y-K (1981) Welfarism: a defence against Sen’s attack. Econ J 91: 531–535CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. Pande R (2003) Can mandated political representation increase policy influence for disadvantaged minorities? theory and evidence from India. Am Econ Rev 93: 1132–1151CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. Reilly B (2002a) Electoral systems for divided societies, vol 13. Johns Hopkins University Press, Balltimore, pp 156–170Google Scholar
  23. Reilly B (2002b) Social choice in the south seas: electoral innovation and the Borda count in the Pacific Island countries. Int Polit Sci Rev 23: 355–372CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  24. Saari DG (1994) Geometry of voting, Studies in economic theory 3. Springer, New YorkGoogle Scholar
  25. Saari DG (2003) Unsettling aspects of voting theory. Econ Theory 22: 529–555CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  26. Satterthwaite MA (1975) Strategy proofness and Arrow’s conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions. J Econ Theory 10: 187–217CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  27. Sen A (1977) Social choice theory: a re-examination. Econometrica 45: 53–89CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  28. Sen A (1979) Personal utilities and public judgements: or what’s with welfare economics. Econ J 89: 537–558CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  29. Sen A (1981) A reply to ‘welfarism: a defence against Sen’s attack’. Econ J 91: 531–535CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  30. Sen A (1999a) The possibility of social choice. Am Econ Rev 89: 349–378CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  31. Sen A (1999b) Democracy as a universal value. J Democr 10.3: 3–17CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  32. Stensholt E (1996) Circle pictograms for vote vectors. SIAM Rev 38: 96–116CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  33. Stensholt E (2002) Nonmonotonicity in AV. Voting Matters, issue 15: 5–10Google Scholar
  34. Stensholt E (2004) Single transferable votes with tax cuts. SIAM Rev 46: 417–442CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  35. Stensholt E (2007) Elections in split societies (Review). Voting Matters, issue 24: 47–56Google Scholar
  36. Tideman N (1995) The single transferable vote. J Econ Perspect 9: 27–38Google Scholar
  37. Weber RJ (1995) Approval Voting. J Econ Perspect 9: 39–49Google Scholar
  38. Woodall DR (1996) Monotonicity and single-seat election rules. Voting Matters, issue 6: 9–14Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Norwegian School of Economics and Business AdministrationBergenNorway

Personalised recommendations