Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 35, Issue 1, pp 49–64 | Cite as

A quantitative discursive dilemma

  • Carl Andreas Claussen
  • Øistein Røisland
Original Paper


The typical judgment aggregation problem in economics and other fields is the following: a group of people has to judge/estimate the value of an uncertain variable y, which is a function of k other variables, i.e., yD(x 1, . . . , x k ). We analyze when it is possible for the group to arrive at collective judgements on the variables that respect D. We consider aggregators that fulfill Arrow’s IIA-condition and neutrality. We show how possibility and impossibility depend on the functional form of D, and generalize Pettit’s (2001) binary discursive dilemma to quantitative judgements.


Preference Relation Aggregation Method Dependence Function Corporate Board Judgment Aggregation 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Sveriges RiksbankStockholmSweden
  2. 2.Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway)OsloNorway

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