Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 34, Issue 3, pp 441–454 | Cite as

Efficiency and stability in a model of wireless communication networks

Original Paper


We introduce a model of (wireless communication) networks: a group of agents want to communicate with each other; an agent has his own position, chooses his costly communication range, and benefits from direct and indirect communications with other agents; any two agents can directly communicate if each agent is located within another agent’s communication range; they can indirectly communicate if each agent is connected to another agent through a sequence of direct communications. Although efficiency and stability are not compatible in a general context, we identify interesting subclasses of problems where an efficient and stable network exists: the uniform interval model, the uniform circle model, and the communication favorable domain. We also investigate the consequence of allowing agents to relocate their positions. For certain networks, relocation-proofness is equivalent to stability.


Network Formation Cost Abatement Econ Theory Communication Range Strong Stability 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsVanderbilt UniversityNashvilleUSA
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsSeoul National UniversitySeoulKorea

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