Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 34, Issue 3, pp 363–369 | Cite as

A note on the optimal level of public inputs

  • Diego MartinezEmail author
  • A. Jesus Sanchez
Original Paper


This paper analyses whether the first-best level of public inputs exceeds the second-best level. On the basis of a simple model, we argue that the level of productivity-enhancing public expenditures is always higher than the level of public inputs provided with distortionary taxation.


Public Spending Indifference Curve Public Good Provision Public Input Production Possibility Frontier 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity Pablo OlavideSevilleSpain

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