Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 34, Issue 1, pp 65–103 | Cite as

Jury theorems with multiple alternatives

Original Paper


I consider a game in which imperfectly informed jurors vote to select one of several possible choices when there is a natural ordering of the possibilities. Each juror votes for the largest alternative the juror would like to implement, and the alternative that is selected is the largest alternative supported by a given number of jurors. For non-unanimous voting rules, the probability of a mistaken judgment goes to zero as the number of jurors goes to infinity. I also give necessary and sufficient conditions to obtain asymptotic efficiency under unanimous voting rules, and show that unanimous rules may lead to a bias in which moderate outcomes are never chosen.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Graduate School of BusinessStanford UniversityStanfordUSA

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