Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 33, Issue 3, pp 505–515 | Cite as

Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations

Original Paper

Abstract

We consider the problem of designing a mechanism to allocate objects to agents when each agent has a quota that must be filled exactly. Agents are assumed to have responsive preferences over items. We show that the only strategy-proof, Pareto optimal, and nonbossy mechanisms are sequential dictatorships. We also show that the only strategy-proof, Pareto optimal, nonbossy, and neutral mechanisms are serial dictatorships. Since these negative results hold for responsive preferences, they hold for more general preferences as well.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Graduate School of BusinessStanford UniversityStanfordUSA

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