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Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 33, Issue 3, pp 423–447 | Cite as

Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods

  • Kentaro Hatsumi
  • Shigehiro Serizawa
Original Paper

Abstract

We consider the allotment problem of homogeneous indivisible goods among agents with single-peaked and risk-averse von Neumann–Morgenstern expected utility functions. We establish that a rule satisfies coalitional strategy-proofness, same-sideness, and strong symmetry if and only if it is the uniform probabilistic rule. By constructing an example, we show that if same-sideness is replaced by respect for unanimity, this statement does not hold even with the additional requirements of no-envy, anonymity, at most binary, peaks-onlyness and continuity.

Keywords

Utility Function Marginal Distribution Deterministic Model Probabilistic Rule Division Problem 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Graduate School of EconomicsOsaka UniversityToyonakaJapan
  2. 2.Institute of Social and Economic ResearchOsaka UniversityIbarakiJapan

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