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Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 33, Issue 1, pp 87–99 | Cite as

Sequential entry in many-to-one matching markets

  • Elette Boyle
  • Federico EcheniqueEmail author
Original Paper

Abstract

We study sequential bargaining in many-to-one matching markets. We show that there is an advantage to entering late in the market, and that the last agent to enter the market will receive his or her best partner in a stable matching, extending the results of Blum and Rothblum (J Econ Theory 103(2):429–443, 2002) and Cechlárová (Randomized matching mechanism revisited. Mimeo, Safarik University, 2002) for the marriage model. We also discuss the relation between sequential bargaining and a possible alternative formulation based on the NTU Shapley value.

Keywords

Econ Theory Marriage Market Stable Match Sequential Entry Matching Market 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Massachusetts Institute of TechnologyCambridgeUSA
  2. 2.Division of the Humanities and Social SciencesCalifornia Institute of TechnologyPasadenaUSA

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