Social Choice and Welfare

, 32:197 | Cite as

Moral hazard and free riding in collective action

  • Vincent AnesiEmail author
Original Paper


Most political and economic theorists point to moral hazard in teams as the main obstacle to lobbies’ collective action. In this paper, we address this important issue with a coalition-formation game. In the process of doing so, we characterize equilibrium lobby structures both in the absence and in the presence of moral hazard. Three notable results emerge from such an exercise: (1) an equilibrium lobby structure exists under both specifications of the model, (2) moral hazard in teams may raise large groups’ equilibrium lobby size, and (3) it may also raise the level of collective action of large groups with low organizational costs.


Nash Equilibrium Collective Action Moral Hazard Stability Function Equilibrium Structure 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of EconomicsUniversity of NottinghamNottinghamUK

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