Networks and outside options
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We introduce and characterize a component efficient value for TU games with a cooperation structure which in contrast to the Myerson (Math Oper Res 2:225–229, 1977) value accounts for outside options. It is based on the idea that the distribution of the worth within a component should be consistent with some connected graph which reflects the outside options of the component’s players.
KeywordsNash Equilibrium Connected Graph Coalition Structure Complete Network Cooperation Structure
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