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Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 32, Issue 1, pp 1–13 | Cite as

Networks and outside options

  • André CasajusEmail author
Original Paper

Abstract

We introduce and characterize a component efficient value for TU games with a cooperation structure which in contrast to the Myerson (Math Oper Res 2:225–229, 1977) value accounts for outside options. It is based on the idea that the distribution of the worth within a component should be consistent with some connected graph which reflects the outside options of the component’s players.

Keywords

Nash Equilibrium Connected Graph Coalition Structure Complete Network Cooperation Structure 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Professur für MikroökonomikUniversität LeipzigLeipzigGermany

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