Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 31, Issue 4, pp 693–707 | Cite as

Scale invariance and similar invariance conditions for bankruptcy problems

  • Thierry Marchant
Original Paper


A frequent motivation for the use of scale invariance in the bankruptcy literature is that it imposes that the outcome of a bankruptcy problem does not depend on the units of measurement. We show that this interpretation is not correct. Scale invariance is an invariance condition that applies when all amounts are multiplied by a constant (without change of units). With this interpretation in mind, it is natural to consider other invariance conditions, for example one that applies when all amounts are increased by the same constant. In this paper, we analyze the consequences of several invariance conditions.


Scale Invariance Invariance Condition Division Rule Proportional Rule Bankruptcy Problem 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Ghent UniversityGhentBelgium

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