Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism with general priority structures
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The Boston mechanism is a centralized student assignment mechanism used in many school districts in the US. We investigate strategic behavior of students under the Boston mechanism when schools may have complex priority structures. We show that a stable matching is supported as an outcome of a Nash equilibrium under a general environment. We further show that any outcome of a Nash equilibrium is a stable matching when the school priorities are substitutable.
KeywordsNash Equilibrium School District Aggregate Demand Dominant Strategy Stable Match
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