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Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 31, Issue 3, pp 357–365 | Cite as

Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism with general priority structures

  • Fuhito Kojima
Original Paper

Abstract

The Boston mechanism is a centralized student assignment mechanism used in many school districts in the US. We investigate strategic behavior of students under the Boston mechanism when schools may have complex priority structures. We show that a stable matching is supported as an outcome of a Nash equilibrium under a general environment. We further show that any outcome of a Nash equilibrium is a stable matching when the school priorities are substitutable.

Keywords

Nash Equilibrium School District Aggregate Demand Dominant Strategy Stable Match 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsHarvard UniversityCambridgeUSA

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