Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 31, Issue 2, pp 257–269 | Cite as

Iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies in binary voting agendas with sequential voting

Original Paper

Abstract

This paper describes the correspondences between the results given by backward induction (BI) and iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies (IEWDS) in binary voting agendas with sequential voting. When the voters have strict preferences over all candidates, the strategies that survive IEWDS all select the unique candidate selected by the BI strategy profiles. But if some voters are indifferent, this result no longer holds. However, when there are only two candidates, it is possible to demonstrate strong relationships between the results given by BI and IEWDS, even when some voters have indifferences.

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References

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Graduate School of BusinessStanford UniversityStanfordUSA

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